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A kidney-paired donation (KPD) pool consists of
transplant candidates and their incompatible donors,
along with nondirected donors (NDDs). In amatch run,
exchanges are arranged among pairs in the pool via
cycles, aswell as chains created fromNDDs. A problem
of importance is how to arrange cycles and chains
to optimize the number of transplants. We outline
and examine, through example and by simulation, four
schemes for selecting potential matches in a realistic
model of a KPD system; proposed schemes take
account of probabilities that chosen transplants may
not be completed as well as allowing for contingency
plans when the optimal solution fails. Using data on
candidate/donor pairs and NDDs from the Alliance for
Paired Donation, the simulations extend over 8
match runs, with 30 pairs and 1 NDD added between
each run. Schemes that incorporate uncertainties
and fallbacks into the selection process yield substan-
tially more transplants on average, increasing the
number of transplants by asmuch as 40% compared to
a standard selection scheme. The gain depends on the
degree of uncertainty in the system. The proposed
approaches can be easily implemented and provide
substantial advantages over current KPD matching
algorithms.
Abbreviations: APD, Alliance for Paired Donation; DPD,
domino-paired donation; HLA, human leukocyte anti-
gen; KPD, kidney-paired donation; MFR, match failure
rate; NDD, nondirected donor; NEAD, nonsimultaneous
extended altruistic donor; PFR, pair failure rate; PRA,
panel reactive antibodies
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Introduction
In a kidney-paired donation (KPD) pool, pairs consisting of
kidney transplant candidates and intended but incompatible
donors are matched with other complementary pairs in an
attempt to find combinations such that enrolled candidates
can obtain a transplant (1–4). An exchange cycle (or simply
‘‘cycle’’) involves a sequence of matches where the donor
of one pair donates to the candidate in the next pair along
the cycle. The cycle is completedwhen the donor in the last
pair gives a kidney to the candidate in the first pair (5). The
cycle is defined so that the candidate in each pair is
matched with a donor who is expected to be immunologi-
cally compatible based upon the candidate’s pattern of
donor-specific antibodies. The initial assessment is referred
to as a virtual crossmatch, which needs to be confirmed by
a laboratory crossmatch. Nondirected donors (NDDs), also
referred to as altruistic donors, can initiate chains of
transplants in the KPD pool that end by transplanting a
candidate on the deceased donor waiting list, called
domino-paired donation (DPD) (6–8). Alternatively, a
nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor (NEAD) chain
segment can be identified in each match run, where the
donor corresponding to the candidate at the end of the
segment, referred to as a bridge donor (9,10), can continue
the chain in a new segment chosen at a later time.
Traditionally, a KPD pool is managed through a sequence of
match runs, whereby at regular intervals, the pool is
assessed and a solution consisting of cycles and chains is
determined such that no pair is simultaneously involved in
more than one cycle or chain. In larger pools, there aremany
cycles and/or chains and consequently many possible
solutions. The preferred selection would ideally be deter-
mined by prespecified objective standards (11), such as
maximizing the total number of potential transplants (12).
Optimization schemes assign a value to each potential
transplant, based upon candidate and/or donor character-
istics. These values are termed utilities and potential
transplants assigned a higher utility receive precedence
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in the optimization. The solution that yields the maximum
total utility of potential transplants is, therefore, the optimal
solution (13). Note that assigning an equal utility of 1 to all
potential transplants results in a solution thatmaximizes the
number of potential transplants.
In cycles, there is a practical limitation that all transplants
should be performed simultaneously in order to avoid the
possibility of a scheduled donor opting to leave the pool
prior to donation. Without this restriction, the possibility
exists that a donor will donate a kidney without the
associated candidate obtaining a transplant. For this reason,
if any one of the transplants in a proposed cycle cannot be
completed, none of the selected transplants in the cycle
can proceed.On the other hand, if one of the transplants in a
proposed chain segment cannot be completed, transplants
prior to the point of failure can still proceed since the issue
of an untransplanted candidatewith no donor does not arise
(6,7,10). Failure to proceed with a proposed transplant
can occur for a number of reasons, including a positive
laboratory crossmatch, a candidate or physician declining
an assigned donor, or donors or candidates having to leave
the pool due to illness or other reasons (14).
Recent studies suggest that optimization schemes that
take into account the probability that selected transplants
fail to proceed to actual transplantation can improve upon
schemes that ignore this uncertainty. These approaches
aim to maximize expected utility and on average increase
the total utility from completed transplants within each
match run (13–15). In addition, one can plan for fallback
options should the optimal solution fail to proceed.
Strategies that include fallback options for each cycle
and chain under evaluation consider all possible sub-
cycles and sub-chains that could be taken as alternatives
in the event that the main cycle or chain fails to
proceed (13). With fallbacks, the expected utility should
take into account the individual expected utilities of each
sub-cycle or sub-chain. An example is given in Figure 1,
which displays a three-way cycle with a possible fallback
to a two-way cycle. This three-way cycle with the fallback
has higher expected utility and would be preferred to a
three-way cycle with no fallback.
It is also possible to extend the idea of fallback options to
more general subsets of pairs and NDD chain segments,
where each subset may have possibilities for cycles and
chains within it. The more cycles and chains that exist
within a subset, the more useful it will be in arranging
fallback options. In our implementation, we consider
subsets of four or fewer pairs and/or NDDs, and seek a
selection of such subsets that maximize the expected
utility, taking account of the fallback options. An example of
such a subset is given in Figure 2.
In these simulations, we evaluate several optimization
schemes with respect to numbers and characteristics of
transplants over the course of several match runs in a
realistic model of KPD program similar to that outlined in
Ashlagi et al (9).
Methods
Data
We used deidentified data on 538 candidate/donor pairs and 55 NDDs
(including bridge donors) from the Alliance for Paired Donation (APD). The
data set includes donor and candidate blood type, major human leukocyte
antigen (HLA) information for the donors, and candidate donor-specific
antibody information and panel reactive antibody (PRA) values. Using this
information on donors and candidates, a virtual crossmatch was performed
for every possible transplant between donor and candidate by assessing
Figure 1: Example of a three-way cycle with a fallback to a
two-way cycle. Pairs are represented by circles and denoted A, B,
and C. An arrow from one pair to a second pair denotes a potential
transplant from the donor in the former to the candidate in the
latter, based on a virtual crossmatch. Should C be unavailable for
transplantation, or either of the potential transplants involving C be
deemed unviable, one could proceed with the transplant between
pairs A and B as a fallback option.
Figure 2: Example of a subset of four pairs, with multiple
fallback options. Pairs are represented by circles and denotedW,
X, Y, Z. An arrow from one pair to a second pair denotes a potential
transplant from the donor in the former to the candidate in the
latter, based on a virtual crossmatch. This subset contains a three-
way cycle between W, X, and Y, and a two-way cycle between Y
and Z. Depending on availability and viability of pairs and matches,
one would proceed with the best available option.
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ABO blood type and HLA antigen-antibody compatibility (at HLA-A, B, Bw,
Cw, DR, DRw, and DQ).
Uncertainties
For each potential transplant, we assign a probability, based on the PRA of
the candidate, that the transplant will be prohibited. These baseline
probabilities, given in Table 1, are taken from Ashlagi et al (9), who remark
that they are empirically determined crossmatch failure rates. Additional
failure rates of 10% and 20% are added to these baseline values in a
sensitivity analysis to reflect potentially higher probabilities of match failure
due to candidate, donor, or physician preferences. We refer to these
probabilities, all of which are summarized in Table 1, as match failure rates
(MFRs). We also consider the probability that each selected pair would be
unable to proceed to transplant, which we took to be 0%, 10%, and 20% in
our simulations; we refer to these probabilities as pair failure rates (PFRs). In
total, we consider nine probability settings with three levels of PFRs for each
of three levels of MFRs.
Optimization schemes
We consider four general optimization schemes that are defined in
Table 2. Calculations are based on those described in Li et al (13). The
simplest scheme, denoted Utility, involves maximizing the utility, defined
as the number of potential transplants of the selected cycles and chains.
This is equivalent to the approach considered by Ashlagi et al (9), and
forms the basis of matching in some existing KPD systems. The second
scheme, denoted Expected Utility, takes both MFR and PFR into account
to find the solution with the largest expected utility. Two additional
optimization schemes, denoted Fallbacks and Extended Fallbacks,
incorporate the idea of contingency planning. The former selects
nonoverlapping cycles and chain and restricts fallbacks to those within
the chosen cycles and chains, whereas the latter considers general
subsets of pairs and NDDs and takes account of fallbacks to sub-cycles
and sub-chains within the chosen subsets.
Match run example
These optimization schemes are illustrated in a relatively simple example in
the Supporting Information that accompanies this article, and the interested
reader is referred there for more detail. To further illustrate themethodology
here, we include a brief example of the solution envisaged in the Extended
Fallbacks scheme; for this example, a comparison to the Fallbacks scheme is
given in the Supporting Information. The example illustrates a match run on
data from April 2014, for 44 pairs and a single NDD in the University of
Michigan KPD pool. The recommendation based on Extended Fallbackswith
subsets of size 4 or less is displayed in Figure 3A. The scheme has chosen
disjoint subsets of four or fewer pairs (and/or NDDs) which include as many
fallback options as possible. Given the solution presented in Figure 3A, we
would check the viability of each potential match, aswell as the availability of
each pair. It is common at this stage that some potential transplants and/or
pairs/NDDs will fail to proceed to transplant for various reasons including
donor or candidate preferences, sickness, or positive lab crossmatch.
Figure 3B shows the potential transplants remaining after a (hypothetical)
assessment of the proposed transplants. We proceed to carry out those
transplants that result in the largest number of candidates receiving a kidney.
In this example, pair 683was unavailable for thematch run, and several other
potential transplants were ruled out. Remaining are the single transplant
from NDD 693 to pair 702, and the two-way cycle between pairs 701 and
642, as well as between 676 and 700.
Simulation description
Simulation parameters and conditions follow those in Ashlagi et al (9),
although we also note the simulations by Gentry et al (8,16) suggesting that
simultaneous DPD chains are preferable to longer NEAD chain segments in
certain situations. We consider DPD chains with a maximum length of 2
(with implicit final donation to the deceased donor list), as well as NEAD
chain segmentswithmaximum allowable chain segment lengths of 3, 4, and
5 (denoted NEAD3, NEAD4, and NEAD5). Two hundred simulations of
evolving KPD pools over eight match runs are performed. Each simulation
implements each of the different optimization schemes (Utility, Expected
Utility, Fallbacks, and Extended Fallbacks) and chain criteria (DPD, NEAD3,
NEAD4, NEAD5). At the beginning of each simulation, 30 incompatible pairs
and 1 NDD for each of the 8 match runs is obtained by sampling with
Table 1: MFR considered in simulations
MFR
PRA level Baseline1 Baselineþ10% Baselineþ20%
75–100 50% 60% 70%
50–74 35% 45% 55%
25–49 20% 30% 40%
0–24 5% 15% 25%
MFR, match failure rates; PRA, panel reactive antibodies.
1Baseline values are taken from Ashlagi et al (9).
Table 2: Description of optimization schemes used in simulations
Utility The optimal solution is the selection of
disjoint cycles and chains with the
highest total utility. Note that, by
setting the utility value for all potential
transplants to 1, we obtain the
selection with the largest number of
transplants. This scheme is
equivalently used by Ashlagi et al (9).
Expected Utility The optimal solution is the selection of
disjoint cycles and chains that yields
the largest expected utility, taking
account of the probabilities that
potential transplants will be confirmed
by laboratory crossmatches and be
viable at the time of transplantation,
and the probabilities that pairs
involved in these transplants will be
available at the time of
transplantation.
Fallbacks The optimal solution is the selection of
disjoint cycles and chains that yields
the maximum total expected utility,
taking into account the fallback
options offered by all sub-cycles and
sub-chains within the selected cycles
and chains.
Extended Fallbacks The optimal solution is the selection of
disjoint subsets of pairs/NDDs that
yield the maximum total expected
utility, taking into account the fallback
options offered by all sub-cycles and
sub-chains within the subsets. The
calculations of expected utility for
each subset proceed analogously to
those used in the Fallbacks scheme
(13,20).
NDDs, nondirected donors.
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replacement from the data, so that each optimization scheme is applied to
the same data.
The simulations described here aim to maximize the number of transplants.
At each match run, the optimal solution is determined based on the
optimization scheme and the chain criterion. After selection, proposed
transplants can fail to proceed, either due to failure on thematch (positive lab
crossmatch or donor/candidate preferences) based on MFR, or if one of the
pairs involved is unable to proceed to transplant, based on PFR.
NEAD chain segments follow the same procedure as in Ashlagi et al (9).
Bridge donors have a renege rate of 1%, representing the rate at which
bridge donors refuse to continue the chain after their associated recipient
receives their transplant. DPD chains end with a final donation to the
deceased donor list, which is included among realized transplants (i.e.
transplants successfully occurring within the simulation) in our results. As in
Ashlagi et al (9), chains which would leave bridge donors with blood type AB
are not allowed. Following completion of each match run, each pair in the
pool has a 2%chance of permanently leaving the pool prior to the nextmatch
run. NDDs and bridge donors remaining at the end of the eighth match run
are recorded as giving rise to one additional transplant, reflecting their
potential to provide further transplants in future match runs, and to obtain
results that are comparable to those of DPD chains. Specific aspects of the
simulation are summarized in Table 3.
The procedure is repeated for each optimization scheme, each chain
criterion, and each of the nine combinations of MFR/PFR. We collect the
number of transplants realized and the characteristics of the associated
recipients (in terms of blood type and PRA) for each policy. We also
summarize the extent to which transplants are accomplished through the
use of cycles or chains. Note that, due to computational complexity, the
optimization scheme denoted Fallbacks has only been simulated for NEAD
chain segments of up to length 4 on each match run (with only 100
iterations performed for the NEAD4 criterion). Extended Fallbacks
considers subsets of size 3 or less, restricting to DPD chain segments
(of length 2), and alternatively, subsets of size 4 or less, restricting to
NEAD chain segments of up to length 3. Simulations were written in Cþþ,
and optimal solutions were selected using the linear programming
software Gurobi 5.6.3 (17).
Results
Transplants and ratio to DPD-Utility
Tables 4 and 5 show, respectively, the number of trans-
plants achieved and the ratio of the number of transplants
achieved compared to the DPD-Utility simulation for each
optimization scheme and chain length. Figure 4 also shows
a selection of the plots corresponding to Table 5 in our high
and low failure rate simulations. Note that in comparing
Extended Fallbacks to other schemes, subsets of size 3 are
compared to DPD chains, and subsets of size 4 are
compared to NEAD chain segments with a maximum
length of 3.
Evaluation of the Utility simulations demonstrates that
maximizing the number of transplants without taking into
account probabilities of failure delivers diminishing returns
Figure 3: (A) Solution for the example match run using Extended
Fallbacks. The solution displays three disjoint subsets of pairs,
represented by white circles, and a single NDD (693) represented
by a gray circle. An arrow from one pair/NDD to another represents
a potential transplant from the donor in the former to the candidate
in the latter, based on a virtual crossmatch. (B) Hypothetical
reduced solution for the Extended Fallbacks scheme after
assessing compatibility and determining availability of pairs. The
dotted circle indicates the unavailability of pair 683 for this match
run, and dotted arrows represent potential transplants that were
deemed unviable, or otherwise removed from consideration.
Bolded arrows represent a choice of transplants resulting from
this reduced solution. In this example, remaining are the single
transplant from NDD 693 to pair 702, and the two-way cycles
between pairs 701 and 642, as well as between 676 and 700. NDD,
nondirected donor.
Table 3: Steps in the simulation procedure for each match run
1 30 pairs and 1 NDD are selected at random with
replacement, and added to the pool.
2 The optimal solution of cycles, chain segments, or
subsets of pairs/NDDs (based on the current
optimization scheme) is obtained using two-way and
three-way cycles, and either DPD chains or NEAD
chain segments.
3 Failure or success of each potential transplant and
selected pair is determined by simulation. Failed
matches are removed from future match runs. Failed
pairs return to the pool for the next match run.
4 For Utility and Expected Utility, if failure occurs
anywhere in a cycle, none of the selected transplants
proceed. If failure occurs in a chain, all the candidates
prior to the point of failure are transplanted. Once
viability of transplants and pairs is determined, the
Fallbacks and Extended Fallbacks schemes may still
contain cycles/chains/subsets with multiple possible
transplant choices. For each of these, a (much
simpler) Utility optimization is applied to select the
transplants within the cycle/chain/subset to
implement.
5 Realized transplants are recorded and corresponding
donors and candidates are removed from the pool.
6 Pairs and bridge donors are removed from the pool
based on attrition and renege rates respectively.
NDD, nondirected donor; DPD, domino-paired donation; NEAD,
nonsimultaneous extended altruistic donor.
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as chain segment length increases past 4. Results for
Utility are qualitatively similar to those reported in Ashlagi
et al (9).
As compared to DPD-Utility, we obtain between 2% and
44% more transplants by using the Extended Fallbacks
scheme. In general, the advantage of Fallbacks and
Extended Fallbacks over Utility increases as the failure
rates increase. Extended Fallbacks outperformed all other
schemes for all maximum chain lengths considered, and
this strategy provided the largest number of transplants in
all simulations.
Transplant distribution
Figure 5 illustrates the distributions of achieved transplants
over the course of our high and low failure rate simulations.
For Utility, the proportion of transplants completed via
chains increases as chain segment length increases.
Expected Utility shows relatively little change in transplant
distribution asmaximumchain segment length ranges from
3 to 5, especially as the probabilities of failure (MFR and
PFR) increase. The analogous result for Fallbacks and
Extended Fallbacks is not clear since to date, time and
memory resources have restricted simulations for the
longer chain segment lengths in these cases.
Figure 4: Ratio of number of transplants for each scheme compared to the DPD Utility scheme. Maximum chain length of two
corresponds to the DPD strategy applied to each optimization scheme. Parenthetical remarks under each panel indicate the values of MFR
and PFR, where ‘‘MFR: BLþ0%’’ refers to Baseline MFR, and ‘‘MFR: BLþ20%’’ refers to Baselineþ20% MFR (see Table 1). DPD,
domino-paired donation; MFR, match failure rate; PFR, pair failure rate.
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Blood type and PRA distributions
The distribution of blood type among transplant recipients is
similar for all schemes and failure rates. Similarly, we do not
observe any differences between schemes in the propor-
tion of candidates of each blood type receiving a transplant
over the course of the match runs.
Figure 6 displays the proportion of patientswithin each PRA
grouping that receive a transplant. We find that a higher
proportion of the Utility transplants are of candidates with
high PRA compared to Expected Utility simulations with no
fallbacks; this is as expected since the Expected Utility
approach introduces bias against higher PRA candidates for
whom selected transplants are less likely to be completed.
When contingency plans are taken into account at the
optimization stage as in Fallbacks and Extended Fallbacks,
however, these biases are reduced. This is an empirical
result that is not easily explained on intuitive grounds. It
appears, however, that incorporating fallback options in the
allocations tends to includemore candidates with high PRA
in the chosen sets since the penalty for their inclusion is
reduced by the presence of fallbacks.
Discussion
In the Utility approach, where no account is taken of
potential failures, long chain segments tend to be selected
as opposed to smaller cycles or chain segments. When the
probability of failure is substantial, long chain segments will
tend to end early resulting in fewer transplants than one
would have obtained with a selection that takes these
probabilities into account. In Figure 5, we see that the
proportion of transplants from chains increases markedly
with chain segment length under the Utility scheme.
Although less dramatic, this increase is also seen in the
other schemes considered.
The primary finding of this work is that there is substantial
advantage for KPD programs from taking into account
possible fallback options at the optimization stage, as in the
Fallbacks and Extended Fallbacks schemes. This confirms
and extends the results of previous studies (13,14,18). An
ad hoc approach would be to select cycles and chains
simply by maximizing utility, but then to look for fallback
options within that selection. We have also simulated this
Figure 5: Transplant distribution charts for each optimization scheme indicating average number of transplants achieved via
cycles, chains, anddonations to thewaiting list. The top (bottom) panel corresponds to simulationswithBaseline (Baselineþ20%)MFR
and 0% (20%) PFR. MFR, match failure rate; PFR, pair failure rate.
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approach; although this offers improvement over a Utility
scheme alone, there remains a substantial advantage to
taking account of contingency or fallback options at the
planning stage.
The probabilities assigned are meant to encompass all
possible failures within a KPD: the MFR represents all
match-specific failures, including the willingness to accept
a proposed match, and the PFR represents the potential
unavailability of a pair. We have modeled a range of
probabilities of failure for the match and the pair in what
might be viewed as a sensitivity study. Ideally, these
probabilities on the match and the pair would be empirically
determined based on experience in KPDs. In the absence
of such data, however, it is still useful to incorporate an
overall level of uncertainty that is more or less reflective
of experience. The values for the MFRs and PFRs we
specify are perhaps low given experience at the APD
and the Michigan KPD programs. If more precise values
for the failure rates were available from data, they could
be incorporatedwithout difficulty. Ignoring uncertainties, as
is done in traditional schemes, is equivalent to assuming
that the failure rates are null and is certainly suboptimal;
including even approximate uncertainties and introducing
fallbacks would be expected to achieve more transplants.
Optimization schemes that take account of the probability
of failure may introduce bias toward potential transplants
that are most likely to move ahead to completion. Thus,
one might expect biases against high PRA candidates and
in favor of lower PRA candidates where the success
probability for the match is higher. Figure 6 examines the
issue of PRA for the optimization schemes considered.
There may be advantage to proactively giving preference to
highly sensitized candidates by assigning additional utility
to a potential transplant when the candidate is highly
sensitized. Evaluating such schemes is an area under
current investigation. All of these methods can be
generalized to allow utility assignments to potential trans-
plants which assign extra value, for example, to high PRA
candidates, O to O transplants or candidates with long
waiting times. Alternatively, one could use utilities that
reflect the likely outcome of the proposed transplant,
such as the probability of 5-year graft survival. We are
Figure 6: Distributions of the proportion of candidates of each PRA level transplanted over the course of the match runs in each
scheme. The top (bottom) panel corresponds to simulations with Baseline (Baselineþ20%) MFR and 0% (20%) PFR. PRA, panel reactive
antibodies; MFR, match failure rate; PFR, pair failure rate.
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investigating such utility schemes in further research,
but the general conclusions that taking uncertainties
and fallbacks into account increases the number of realized
transplants seem to hold for all such utility assignments.
Compatible pairs can also be included into KPD programs,
especiallywhen there ispotential advantage to thecandidate
in the compatible pair (19). Our simulations do not include
such pairs, although their inclusion would not fundamentally
change modeling strategies. In the APD and University of
Michigan KPD experience, compatible pairs tend to be
less likely to participate in an exchange, which would
correspond to a higher MFR, and it is likely that such pairs
would tend to leave the pool early if no suitable match is
obtained. Additional complexities arise in multi-program
setups, where pairs are enrolled and can potentially
participate in several programs. These methods may still
be valuable in a given program, even with interference
from other programs; the interference would tend to
increase the uncertainties as represented by MFR and
PFR, but more work would need to be done to estimate
probabilities under these circumstances. Several assump-
tions in our simulations may not hold for all KPD programs,
depending on protocols. For example, some KPD programs
may turn down entire selected chains that cannot be
completed, instead of allowing them to proceed until a point
of failure. We would expect such a protocol to increase the
desirability of shorter chain segments of only 2 or 3 in a given
match run.
We believe the match runs as described provide an orderly
approach that alleviate the logistical issues associatedwith re-
selecting and then reconstituting the pool whenever an
exchange is found to fail.Althoughquestionsof lengthofchain
are not completely settled, especially for Extended Fallbacks,
it appears fromour results that theremaybe little advantage in
considering chain segments longer than 3. It should be
emphasized,however, that longNEADchainsarestill valuable
as they build up through a series of shorter segments
determined in a strategic manner over several match runs. In
ourExtendedFallbackssimulationwithNEAD-3, thefirstNDD
gives rise to a chain of average length roughly 5.5 (Baseline
MFR,0%PFR) to4.5 (Baselineþ 20%MFR,20%PFR)by the
end of the 8th match run, even though each match run
segment is of size 3 or less (75th percentile ranged from6 to 7
dependingonMFR/PFR;maximumlength ranged from10 [for
20% PFR, Baselineþ10%, and Baselineþ 20%MFR] to 15
[for Baselineþ 10% MFR, 0% PFR])..
The algorithms discussed in this article require extensive
computation, especially for optimization using fallback
options. This might become a problem for large nationwide
pools, where the pool size could be on the order of
thousands (14), as opposed to a few hundred maximum in
these simulations. It should be noted, however, that
implementing these strategies for a single match run, as
opposed to simulations with hundreds of replicates, is a
much simpler problem and feasible for fairly large pools.
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Supplemental Methods
Appendix: Illustration of optimization schemes, match run
example revisited.
Table S1: Number of transplants and expected number of
transplants for cycles and chains in the example of Figure
S1, both without and with fallbacks.
Table S2: Optimization schemes and their expected
utilities taking account of fallbacks where appropriate.
Figure S1: An example of a small KPD pool to illustrate
the optimization schemes used. Pairs 1 through 5 are
denoted by white circles; NDD 6 is represented by a gray
circle. An arrow fromone pair/NDD to a second pair denotes
a potential transplant from the former to the latter.
Figure S2: Illustration of the results of the optimization
schemes applied to the KPD pool in Figure S1. The
panels (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) correspond, respectively, to
the solutions obtained under the Utility, Expected Utility,
Fallbacks, and Extended Fallbacks schemes.
Figure S3: (A) Solution for the example match run from
the main paper using the Fallbacks scheme. The solution
contains two three-way cycles and a chain of length 1,
consisting of pairs, represented by white circles, and a
single NDD (693) represented by a gray circle. An arrow
from one pair/NDD to another represents a potential
transplant from the donor in the former to the candidate
in the latter, based on a virtual crossmatch. (B) Hypothetical
reduced solution for the Fallbacks scheme after assessing
compatibility and determining availability of pairs. The
dotted circle indicates the unavailability of pair 683 for
this match run, and dotted arrows represent potential
transplants deemed unviable, or otherwise removed from
consideration. Bolded arrows represent a choice of trans-
plants resulting from this reduced solution. In this example,
remaining are the single transplant from NDD 693 to pair
702, and the two-way cycle between pairs 701 and 642; no
transplants result from the final (right-most) selected cycle.
Uncertainties and Fallbacks in KPD
2645American Journal of Transplantation 2015; 15: 2636–2645
